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RUSSIAN SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT:  
GENERAL PATTERNS 
 
 
Based on the census data from 1989, 
2002 and 2010, the article analyzes the 
evolution of the ethnic structure of the 
population of the post-Soviet Russia from 
the territorial perspective. The stability of 
the ethnic structure of the “Russian mega 
nucleus” and indigenization of the nation-
al regions are considered in view of the 
differences in migration trends during the 
two inter-census periods and the socioeco-
nomic situation in the regions. The urbani-
zation rate of major ethnic groups is an 
indirect indicator of the prospects of tradi-
tional “primordial” ethnic identities in 
different ethnic groups. Special attention is 
paid to new trends — an increase in the 
number of people refraining from answer-
ing the question about their ethnic identity 
or giving an unclear answer. Alongside se-
rious census errors, this phenomenon can 
be a result of growing complexity of the 
ethnic identity structures and the processes 
of modernization, which occur at different 
rates in Russian and national regions. 
Based on the 2010 census data, the article 
analyses the differences in polyethnicity 
between the rural and urban population, 
which are accounted for by the historical 
background, particularities of regional de-
velopment, settlement features, and migra-
tion processes of the past two decades. 
 
Key words: ethnic geography, popula-
tion censuses, ethnic mosaic index, popu-
lation geography 
 
 Features and problems of ethnic-
ity recording. Russia is one of the 
countries where ethnocultural diversity 
has always been a major influence on 
domestic and foreign policy. However, 
before the nation state could fully de-
veloped, Russia had been strongly in-
fluenced by ethnonational concepts bor-
rowed from Austria-Hungary and Ger-
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many alongside social democratic ideas. At the turn of the 20th century, such 
authoritative experts on the national issue as K.Kautsky, O. Bauer, and 
K. Renner took part in the discussion about the essence of the concept of na-
tion and the possible — territorial and exterritorial — forms of national self-
identification. 
In Russia, Bolsheviks, following classical Marxist authors, considered 
the national issue from the tactical perspective. Lenin — and later Stalin — 
sharply criticised exterritorial national and cultural autonomy, which would 
threaten the ‘unity of workers of all nations’ [5; 6]. However, the right of na-
tions to self-identification in the form of national autonomies could attract 
the population of peripheral areas, where the proportion of proletariat was 
rather insignificant, to the Bolsheviks’ cause. National self-identification 
was believed to become one of the key elements in the struggle for power, 
later it had to be replaced by new international forms of identity [4]. 
In effect, the Soviet ‘national territory’ model of federalism and adminis-
trative division based on controversial and eclectic principles [16], as well as 
ethnic deportations and repatriations, contributed to the persistence of a pri-
mordial interpretation of ethnicity in the minds of the population. It dates 
back to the traditionalistic, primarily agrarian, inert society, where ethnos 
was considered as an objective kinship and marriage-based social association 
of people having common interests and goals. Ethnicity, assigned by birth, 
was an obligatory entry in national IDs until the 1990s. As a result, the dom-
inance of the primordial approach to ethnicity in the minds of ordinary citi-
zens and most of the Russian elite poses a serious challenge for the country’s 
future. 
Prior to censuses, official lists of peoples and their hierarchy were ap-
proved by the country’s political leadership. Moreover, the lists were largely 
affected by the particularities of the current political situation.  
The post-Soviet censuses of 2002 and 2010 were conducted and are ana-
lysed against the background of the dispute about the nature of ethnicity. In 
the 1990-2000s, there emerged new ethnic trends — specific features of eth-
nicity reproduction in large cities, multiple or uncertain ethnic identities, and 
a rapidly changing ethnic identity under the impact of political shifts or its 
mobilisation in conflict situations. These trends can be explained using the 
instrumentalist and constructivist concepts focused on either the functions of 
ethnicity or the ways of its mobilisation and cultivation [8; 13; 14]. 
Except for the expanded list of ethnic groups, post-Soviet censuses 
were poorly adapted to the new processes [10; 11]. One of their key prob-
lems was the unambiguous interpretation of ethnicity and the quality of 
census organisation. Cases of questionnaires filled in without personal in-
terviews, using the data available to the authorities, were registered almost 
everywhere. Intensive migration processes, a significant increase in the 
temporarily registered and non-registered population reduces the number 
of census participants. However, despite all their flaws, censuses remain 
the key source of data on the territorial structure of the population’s ethnic 
composition. This structure is affected by a combination of the classical 
ethnodemographic processes relating to natural changes and migration and 
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nationally new ones relating to the transformation and complication of the 
ethnic identity structure. 
An analysis of territorial shifts in the composition of Russia’s ethnic 
space traditionally includes three key components: 
— Russian ‘mega nucleus’, whose boundaries, according to V. N. Stre-
letsky, largely (but not completely) correspond to the border of the ‘Russian’ 
regions [12]; 
— national regions sharply differentiated by their proportion in the 
country’s population and the proportion of title ethnic groups; 
— transitional ethnic contact zone, whose structure has become much 
more intricate over the past decades. 
‘Internal’ ethic contact zones — large cities with a mosaic ethnic compo-
sition are expanding alongside the traditional contact zone belts on the pe-
riphery of the Russian mega nucleus. Although, as a rule, the proportion of 
large cities’ ethnic minorities is not very significant, their activity, competi-
tion in the labour market, and ethnicity-based settlement areas attract in-
creasing attention [3]. However, there is no definite answer to the question 
whether the large cities’ ethnic diasporas are groups of people brought to-
gether by objective goals and needs or groups that are artificially constructed 
and mobilised by the elites. 
The configuration of the Russian mega nucleus — territories character-
ised by the absolute dominance (over 80%) of Russians in the ethnic compo-
sition — has not significantly changed over the post-Soviet period (fig. 1). 
However, even in view of serious errors in the census data and despite the 
general stability1, one can observe various unfolding in these regions. Only 
on the periphery of the Central and Northwestern regions, the proportion of 
Russians and their ‘satellites’2 in the ethnic structure of population is rela-
tively stable, whereas its decrease is correlated with the increase in the num-
ber of questionnaires with unspecified ethnicity (fig. 2). Most of these re-
gions located beyond the -Black earth area are not very attractive in socio-
economic terms. 
In the Central Black Earth region, the stable high proportion of Slavic ethnic 
groups is accounted for by the changing identity of Russian Ukrainians. Not only 
within Sloboda Ukraine at the modern Russian-Ukrainian border, but also in the 
other regions, Ukrainians and Belarusians demonstrate an increasingly complex 
and often dual ethnic identity. This is manifested in the rapid decrease in the  
                                                      
1 If the ethnic structure is calculated not as part of total population but as that of 
those who answered the ethnicity question, the proportion of Russians and their 
‘satellites’ it decreasing at a much slower rate (from 83.3% in 2002 to 82.9% in 
2010), whereas the proportion of Russians ‘proper’ slightly increased from 79.8% 
to 81.5% [9]. However, the failure to take into account ‘unsure’ respondents, 
whose proportion is rather considerable in the most urbanised and attractive for 
migrants regions, does not seem to be justified. 
2 V.V. Pokshishevsky coined the term Russian ‘satellites’ to describe Ukrainians and 
Belarusians who, alongside Russians, took the most active part in the colonisation 
processes in the Russian Empire and the USSR and entered into inter-ethnic mar-
riages [7].  
S
. 
S
af
ro
no
v 
 
 
10
9
 
 
Fig
. 1
. T
he 
Ru
ssi
an 
‘m
ega
 nu
cle
us’
 ac
cor
din
g t
o t
he 
20
10
 ce
nsu
s 
109
Russian spatial development: general patterns 
 
 110
proportion of Ukrainians and Belarusians31 in the post-Soviet period, which cannot 
be explained by purely ethnodemographic processes, including migration [2]. 
 
 Fig. 2. The urbanisation level of ethnic groups in Russia, according to the 2010 census:  
(a) — titular peoples of Russian national autonomies, 
(b) — titular peoples of former Soviet republics  
                                                     
3
1 In 2002—2010, the proportion of Ukrainians and Belarusian continued to rapidly 
decrease across the country, including the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands. Along-
side natural decrease and insignificant migration outflow, another significant factor 
was the assimilation processes following the disintegration of the USSR: as genera-
tions changed, the youth increasingly associated themselves with the dominant eth-
nocultural tradition. Although Ukrainians remain the third largest ethnic group in 
Russia (1.93 million people), their numbers, as well as those of Belarusians (0.54 
million people) declined almost by 55% as compared to 1989. 
An increased proportion of Belarusians is still observed in the ‘trophy’ regions (the 
Kaliningrad region and South-East Karelia), where they were resettled in the 1940-50s 
after World War II. The above the national average proportion of Ukrainians is ob-
served in many regions of the European North and the Asian part of the country, 
whose populated formed under the impact of pre-revolutionary settlers’ migrations and 
Soviet labour migrations. Ukrainians comprise over 5% of population in the Khanty-
Mansi, Yamal-Nenets, and Chukotka autonomous region, and the Magadan region. 
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In the Asian part of the country, the proportion of Russians and their 
‘satellites’ is rather high and stable within the major settlement area 
stretching from the West to the East along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In 
the 1990-2000s, large cities — especially regional centres — located 
along the Railway accepted part of Russians migrating from the northern 
territories. 
In the post-Soviet period, a significant reduction in the proportion of 
Slavic ethnic groups in the mega-nucleus has been characteristic of eco-
nomically developed and attractive for migrants Saint Petersburg, Mos-
cow, and some regions contiguous on the capital, which serve as stopover 
sites on the way to Moscow. An interesting situation is observed in Mos-
cow. The 2010 census data ‘refute’ the thesis about the increasing poly-
ethnicity of the capital, which was demonstrated by the 2002 census. This 
can be explained by the low quality of the recent census and the limited 
coverage of the actual Moscow population. 
A decrease in the proportion of Russians in the total national popula-
tion is accounted for by the respondents who did not answer the ethnicity 
questions, which — with reservations — is one of the major trends in the 
transformation of the ethnic identity. In total, such respondents com-
prised 5.6 million people leaving behind Tatars — the second largest eth-
nic group in Russia. D. Bogoyavlensky quaintly called them the second 
largest quasi-people [2]. The term the unsure, a new element to the Rus-
sian ethnic structure, should be interpreted within the constructivist con-
cept of ethnicity. A significant increase in their number of the unsure was 
accounted for by both technical errors (questionnaires completed using 
administrative data, which do not include information on ethnicity) and 
by abandoning the practice of specifying ethnicity in national IDs, which 
made a multiple identity possible [10; 11]. 
Therefore, territories with an increased proportion of the ‘unsure’ res-
idents include regions with complicated conditions for conducting a cen-
sus (remoteness and low population density) and urbanised regions with 
intensive migration (fig. 3). Firstly, it is federal cities, the most ‘ad-
vanced’ neighbours of the Moscow region, where this process started as 
early as the 1990s, and the most urbanised regions of Ural and Western 
Siberia. 
The lowest proportion of the unsure was observed in the regions 
where ethnic identity is crucial for the wellbeing of an individual living 
under constant pressure from the society with strong traditions, where 
ethnic identity is a means of political mobilisation aimed to increase the 
proportion of the titular ethnic group. It is the republic of North Caucasus 
and some regions of the Middle Volga region. 
 A small proportion of the ‘unsure’ was also observed within the ‘eth-
nic contact’ zones. An exception is certain problematic areas, for in-
stance, the Astrakhan region. In ethnic borderlands, the ethnic identity 
also serves as a means to mobilise different population groups, which, as 
the national elites believe, will help them to protect their socioeconomic 
interests and preserving culture.  
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In the 1990s, most Russian national regions41 exhibited another trend in 
the ethnic space transformation, namely, ‘post-Soviet indigenisation’52 — 
an increase in the proportion of titular ethnic groups in the population. This 
process continued in the 2000s, however, at a slower rate.  
Nevertheless, it differed significantly from the Soviet indigenisation, be-
ing caused by a relative higher natural increase rate in the indigenous popu-
lation of the national regions of North Caucasus and the country’s Asian part 
against the background of out-migration or Russians and their ‘satellites’ and 
increasing popularity of ethnic identity. At the same time, socioeconomic in-
stability, growing ethnic tensions, and — as it happened in Tatarstan — per-
sistent policy towards attracting ethnic migrants from abroad led to the con-
centration of titular nations in ‘home’ regions, i. e. an increase in the pro-
portion of ethnic groups residing within their national regions (table). 
 
Titular ethnic groups in Russian national regions * 
according to the 1989, 2002, and 2010 censuses 
 
Region Ethnic group 
Proportion in the 
republic’s  
population, % 
Proportion of the 
ethnic group  
members living  
in the republic, % 
1989 2002 2010 1989 2002 2010 
Republics 
Chechnya Chechens … 93.5 95.1 — 75.8 84.3 
Ingushetia Ingush … 77.3 93.5 — 87.4 86.7 
Chechen-Ingushetia Total 70.7 94.9** 95.9** — — — 
Chechens 57.8 71.7** 72.9** 81.7 82.9** 85.6** 
Ingush 12.9 23.2** 23.0** 76.1 88.1** 87.0** 
Dagestan Total 80.2 86.6 87.4 — — — 
Avars 27.5 29.4 29.2 91.2 93.1 93.2 
Dargins 15.6 16.5 16.9 79.4 83.4 83.2 
Kumyks 12.9 14.2 14.8 83.6 86.6 85.8 
Lezgians 11.3 13.1 13.2 79.4 81.8 81.3 
Laks 5.1 5.4 5.5 86.3 89.3 90.3 
Tyva Tuvans 64.3 77.0 81.0 96.3 96.7 94.5 
Kabardino-Balkaria Total 57.6 67.0 69.7 — — — 
Kabardians 48.2 55.3 57.0 94.2 95.9 94.9 
Balkarians 9.4 11.6 12.6 90.4 96.8 96.2 
                                                     
4
1 Here and below, the study uses information on national administrative units as of 2002. 
5
2 The indigenisation policy was announced at the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) al-
most simultaneously with the introduction of the new economic policy and national 
division efforts. It suggested ‘nurturing local cadre and reliance on the indigenous 
population of the republics’. One of the key objectives of the policy was strengthen-
ing the centre’s paternalism, bringing up a new Soviet elite, struggle with traditional 
cultures, and development of symbols and meanings of an industrial society [16]. 
However, its ‘side effects’ shortly became evident — separatist attitudes among the 
national elite started to increase, which became especially pronounced as the Soviet 
state grew weaker. 
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The end of the table 
 
Region Ethnic group 
Proportion in the 
republic’s  
population, % 
Proportion of the 
ethnic group  
members living  
in the republic, % 
1989 2002 2010 1989 2002 2010 
Chuvashia Chuvash 67.8 67.7 65.1 51.1 54.3 56.7 
North Ossetia-Alania Ossetians 53.0 62.7 64.5 83.2 86.5 87.0 
Kalmykia Kalmyks 45.4 53.3 56.2 88.2 89.6 88.7 
Tatarstan Tatars 48.5 52.9 53.2 32.0 36.0 37.9 
Karachay-Cherkessia Total 40.9 49.8 52.5 — — — 
Cherkess 9.7 11.3 11.8 79.3 81.9 77.2 
Karachays 31.2 38.5 40.7 86.1 88.0 89.0 
Sakha (Yakutia) Yakuts 33.4 45.5 48.7 96.1 97.4 97.6 
Mari El Mari 43.3 42.9 41.8 50.4 51.7 53.1 
Mordovia Mordvins 32.5 31.9 39.9 29.2 33.7 44.8 
Altay Altay 31.0 32.7 33.9 85.2 92.5 92.7 
Buryatia Buryats 24.0 27.8 29.5 59.8 61.3 62.2 
Bashkortostan Bashkirs 21.9 29.8 28.8 64.2 73.0 74.0 
Udmurtia Udmurts 30.9 29.3 27.0 69.5 72.3 74.3 
Adygea Adyghe 22.1 24.2 24.3 77.7 84.1 85.8 
Komi Komi 23.3 25.2 22.5 86.7 87.4 88.7 
Khakassia Khakass 11.1 12.0 12.0 80.1 86.5 87.2 
Karelia Karelians 10.0 9.2 7.1 63.2 70.3 74.9 
Autonomous regions 
Agin-Buryat Buryats 54.9 62.5 65.1 10.1 10.1 10.9 
Komi-Permyak Komi-Permy-
aks 
60.2 59.0 54.2 64.8 64.1 66.7 
Ust-Orda Buryats 36.3 39.6 39.8 11.8 12.1 10.8 
Koryak Koryaks 16.5 26.7 30.3 73.5 76.7 71.4 
Taymyr Total 13.2 21.5 25.8 — — — 
Dolgans 8.9 13.9 15.7 75.0 76.0 68.4 
Nenets 4.4 7.7 10.1 7.2 7.4 7.8 
Chukotka Chukchi 7.3 23.5 25.3 78.9 80.1 80.3 
Evenk Evenks 14.0 21.5 22.0 11.6 10.7 9.3 
Nenets Nenets 11.9 18.7 17.8 18.8 18.8 16.8 
Yamalo-Nenets Nenets 4.2 5.2 5.7 61.2 64.0 66.7 
Khanty-Mansi Total 1.4 1.9 2.0 — — — 
Khanty 0.9 1.2 1.2 53.4 59.7 61.6 
Mansi 0.5 0.7 0.7 79.3 86.5 89.5 
Jewish jews 4.2 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.0 1.0 
 * As of 2002 
** Within the borders of Chechen-Ingush Republic as of 1989 
 
However, these trends manifested rather ambiguously and with different 
intensity largely due to the development particularities of previous historical 
stages. A significant contribution to these processes is made by the eth-
nodemographic factor. Almost all North Caucasian ethnic groups either in-
creased or maintained their numbers over the past inter-census period due to 
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a stable positive natural increase rate. The titular ethnic groups of Ural and 
Volga regions and the European North of Russia have not showed high natu-
ral increase rates in the post-Soviet period. Therefore, three major groups of 
Russian national regions are identified based on the features of transforma-
tions in the ethnic structure of population in the post-war period (fig. 4). 
In the regions of the first group — the republics of North Caucasus, 
Kalmykia, and Tyva — a rapid decrease in the proportion of Russian-
speaking population is a continuation of the preceding trend. At first, it 
was a result of different natural increase rates in different ethnic group. 
Later, another factor appeared — the migration outflow of Russian-
speaking population forced out of the republics. All the above increases 
the influence of traditional cultures in these regions, contributes to the 
preservation of traditional practices, institutions and, thus, the traditional 
ethnic identity, which successfully competes with the civil and national 
political identity. Even regular labour migrations from these regions to 
large cities, which involve a significant part of the male population, can-
not undermine this basic identity. 
 
 Fig. 4. Ethnic composition of the population of Russian national regions  
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A completely different situation is observed in the regions of the second 
group comprised of most national regions of Russia’s European North and the 
Ural and Volga regions, where the natural decrease in the indigenous population 
is accompanied by assimilation processes. This usually results in an insignificant 
increase in the proportion of Russians and their ‘satellites’. The 2010 census 
shows that this trend suddenly reversed in Mordovia without any objective rea-
sons, which is usually explained by either ‘technical particularities of census or-
ganisation’ or ‘community outreach’. This ‘exception’ does not make the preva-
lence of a more complex dual or multiple ethnic identity any less real. 
A different pattern is observed only in two Turkic republics. In Tatar-
stan, a low natural increase rate is accompanied by an active socioeconomic 
and migration policy against the background of gradual outflow of the Rus-
sian-speaking population. In Bashkortostan, the situation is complicated by 
almost equal representation of three ethnic groups — Bashkirs (28.8 %), Ta-
tars (24.8 %), and Russians (35.2 %). The changes in the ethnic structure 
(especially at the municipal level) registered in the 1979, 1989, and 2002 
censuses that can hardly be explained by regular reasons have become a 
textbook case of the influence of administrative factor on census results. 
The third group consists of either resource-oriented or poorly economically 
developed recently reclaimed regions of the country’s Asian part. In these re-
gions, the intensive ‘post-Soviet indigenisation’ was caused not by high natural 
increase rates in the indigenous ethnic groups, but rather by a rapid outflow of 
Russian-speaking population caused by economic factors — a reduction in the 
number of and increasing competition for prestigious jobs, a decrease in the 
standards of living and relative income. In these regions, different population 
groups seem to combine different types of ethnic identity, including multiple 
one. Moreover, the titular ethnic identity is often mobilised by the political el-
ites, as it happened in the Republic of Altay prior to the 2010 census. 
The concentration of ethnic groups within ‘home’ republics results in a 
low urbanisation level (see fig. 2), which contributes to the preservation of 
ethnic traditionalism. Except for Russians, only Tatars and Ossetins — 
whose traditional settlement areas became home to large economic and ad-
ministrative centres — have a high proportion of urban population. Trau-
matic historical past and forced migrations contributed to a higher urbanisa-
tion level in Jews and Laks63. 
A higher urbanisation level is observed in the ethnic diasporas of former 
Soviet republics, which developed largely due to the Soviet and post-Soviet 
labour migrations. The concentration of diaspora members is rather high in 
                                                     
6
3 For the ‘first’ time it happened during the campaign for resettling mountaineers 
into submountain and plain areas, which was fervently pursued by the Soviet author-
ities. In 1944, a number of Laks were resettled into the newly formed Novolaksky 
district, whose lands were left vacant following the deportation of the Akkin Che-
chens. In 2011, against the background of growing ethnic tensions and the territory 
claims of the Akkin Chechens who returned from deportation, a decision was made 
to resettle the residents of the Novolaksky district into the Kirovsky City district of 
Makhachkala. This solution is fraught with ethnic conflicts.  
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regional centres and capitals. The only exceptions are Kazkahs, who prefer 
settling in the rural areas bordering on Kazakhstan and Turkmens — 40% of 
the diaspora live in the rural areas of the Stavropol region, where they were 
resettled from the Mangyshlak Peninsula in the late 17th - early 18th century. 
Diaspora members remain leaders in the increase rate among all Russian 
ethnic groups. In the 1990s, the most rapidly growing ethnic group was Ta-
jiks and persons of Transcaucasian origin forced out of their homelands by 
violent ethnic conflicts and the economic situation. In the 2000s, the maxi-
mum rates were demonstrated, first, by Central Asian people — Kyrgyzs, 
Uzbeks, and Tajiks. According to the official data, the numbers of Georgians 
and Azerbaijanis slightly decreased in the 1990-2000s — a phenomenon that 
can hardly be given a rational explanation. 
Another acknowledged trends in the development of ethnic space in 
post-Soviet Russia is the ‘heterogenisation of large cities’ ethnic composi-
tion’ [12, p. 1]. However, this seemingly evident trend is not universal. In 
Russia, there are several combinations of the level of ethnic diversity in rural 
areas, regional capitals, and other cities. One of the methods for examining 
ethnic diversity is the comparison of corresponding ethnic mosaic indices 
calculated using a technique proposed by B. M. Ekkel74 (fig. 5). In this case, the 
index is employed to assess the ‘theoretical probability of inter-ethnic contacts 
between nationalities’ [15]. 
There are two clearly opposite situations. The values of ethnic mosaic index are 
minimum within the ‘Russian mega nucleus’ — in both the European and Asian 
regions of the country located along the major settlement belt85. The exceptions are 
the centres of several regions neighbouring on the capital. Minimum values are also 
observed in Chechnya and Ingushetia, where almost all Russian-speaking residents 
were forced out in the 1990-2000. The maximum values in the rural areas are regis-
tered in the national republics accommodating several ethnic groups and the regions 
of ‘ethnic contact zones’ involved in mass ethnic migrations. 
Although, on average, cities have a higher ethnic mosaic index, this pattern 
is not universal. The index values for the urban and rural areas of the ‘Russian 
mega-nucleus’ differ insignificantly, by 0.1-0.2. Of course, a more ethnically 
diverse population is found in the regional centres attracting labour migrants. In 
many national republics, large cities, especially capitals, also demonstrate high 
index values accounted for by a large proportion of Russians and their ‘satel-
lites’. In the Russian regions, ‘ethnic contact zones’ of the Middle and Lower 
Volga region, North Caucasus, Ural, the country’s Asian part, and the former 
outposts of Russian colonisation and Soviet industrialisation, cities often show a 
lower mosaic index value as compared to the rural areas.  
                                                     
7
4 B.M. Ekkel’s ethnic composition mosaic index: 
1
(1 )
m
i i
i
P

    , 
where P is the mosaic index of the population’s ethnic structure, m the number of eth-
nic groups in the region, πi the proportion of ith  ethnic group in the total population. 
The calculation took into account ethnic groups comprising over 0.5% of the popula-
tion; Russians and their ‘satellites’ were considered as a single ethnic group. 
8
5 The ethnic diversity of urbanised territories might be underestimated by censuses. 
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Conclusions. A comparative analysis of post-Soviet censuses’ results in 
Russia makes it possible to speak of a complication of ethnic processes in 
the country. Alongside classical ethnodemographic processes, the issues of 
ethnic identity formation and stability play an increasingly important role. 
First of all, this relates to the most attractive and economically and socio-
politically prosperous regions, which demonstrate an increase in the number 
of people that, due to various reasons, do not answer the question about their 
ethnicity. These interregional differences are remarkable even in view of 
technical errors, whereas the thesis about the stability of ‘Russian mega-nu-
cleus’ requires further investigation. 
The processes manifested in the growing proportion of titular ethnic 
groups and the concentration of peoples in ‘home’ republics, characteristic 
of most national regions, slowed down in the 2000s. An increasingly impor-
tant role is performed by labour migrations targeted primarily at the largest 
agglomerations. A significant part of working age (predominantly male) 
population spends most of the year beyond the regions of their permanent 
record. This ‘blurs’ the static territorial ethnic pattern reflected in censuses. 
At the same time, the census data do not make it possible to speak of a 
wider ethnic diversity in the rural areas as compared to Russian cities. The 
ethnic mosaic index is affected by a number of factors that are dissimilar in 
different regions — the size and administrative status of cities, their genesis, 
the development of urban settlement, and the regional economic situation. 
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